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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(g)(Rep.
Vol. 9 1987), as this action involves child custody, adoption and
paternity.
The present action challenges the constitutionality of
certain of Utah's adoption statutes as applied to the facts of
this case and requests relief for deprivation of civil rights,
pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1983, in connection with
the defendants1 action in taking and retaining custody of the
plaintiff's infant daughter.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.
the equal

Does Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) violate
protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article 1 §24 of the Utah
Constitution as it applies to the facts of this case?
2.

Does that same statute violate the due process provision

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitut ion and Article 1 §7 of the Utah Constitution as it
applies to the facts of this case?
3.

Does that same statute violate the provisions of

Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions
and statutes, which are set forth in their entirety in the appendix

to this brief, is determinative of the issues presented by this
appeal:
1.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987);

2.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-12(Rep.Vol. 9 1987);

3.

Utah Constitution, Art. 1 §24;

4.

Utah Constitution, Art. 1 §7;

5.

Utah Constitution, Art. 1 §11;

6.

United States Constitution, Amend. XIV

7.

United States Constitution, Amend. V
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Steven Swayne is seeking a declaratory judgment
and relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983.
The District Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, following an evidentiary hearing, and thereafter
granted the defendants1 motion for summary judgment on both
counts of the complaint.
The following statement of the facts of the case is
supported by citations to the transcript of the testimony of
Penny Paxman given at the November 13, 1987 hearing on plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction, as no index of the record on
appeal has been prepared as of this date.
The basis of plaintifffs complaint is that the defendants
are presently in custody of Mr. Swaynefs infant daughter, who
was born on June 4, 1987. Respondents received custody of the
plaintiff's daughter from Penny Paxman, the child's mother
(Tr. at 8). On June 8, 1987, Penny signed a release surrendering
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the child for adoption and placing her with L.D.S. Social Services.
Prior to that time, Steven Swayne was unaware of any plan by
Penny to place the child for adoption or of any obligation on
his part to file an acknowledgement of paternity and willingness
to support to preserve his parental rights (Tr. at 10).
L.D.S. Social Services allowed Penny to retain physical
custody of the child even after she executed her release of
rights (Tr. at 15). On June 9th she and the child visited Steven
at his home.

This was the second time Steven had received the

child into his home (Tr. at 16). He also had been present in the
delivery room when the child was born and had visited with the
child every day she was in the hospital, including Saturday,
June 6.

Even before the birth of the child he had acknowledged

his paternity publicly to members of his family.

His family held

a baby shower for Penny where she received gifts for the child
(Tr. at 9 ) .
Steven and Penny were never married.
Penny is white.

Steven is black and

Penny's mother arranged for her to meet with

L.D.S. Social Services on June 8.

During that meeting, at which

both of Penny's parents were present, Penny released the child
for adoption, in part because her parents had informed her that
she could have no contact with her family if she kept the baby
(Tr. at 37).
On June 9, Penny told Steven she was taking the baby on
a trip.

She then physically released custody of the child

-3-

to L.D.S. Social Services and left for California.

She called

Steven each day and pretended she had the child with her.

On

Saturday, June 13th, she phoned Steven's family and told them
the baby was dead.

When Steven called her back, she admitted

her deception and agreed to return to Salt Lake City to help
him attempt to gain custody of his daughter (Tr. at 16-18).
On Monday, June 15, Steven filed his acknowledgment
of paternity, he and Penny filed an affidavit to amend the
child's birth certificate to add his name as the father and to
give the child his last name, and they went to L.D.S. Social
Services to ask for the baby.

They were advised that it was

too late and they would have to seek legal counsel (Tr. at 18-19).
These facts are set forth in the transcript of Penny
Paxman!s testimony at the hearing on the motion for
preliminary

injunction.

Additionally, a stipulated

statement of facts is contained in a published opinion of the
United States District Court for the District of Utah.

See

Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 670 F.Supp. 1537 (D.Utah 1987).
Mr. Swayne originally brought suit in Federal District
Court on June 29, 1987.

The Honorable J. Thomas Greene found

that the Court had jurisdiction but, at the request of the
defendants, elected to abstain.
was issued on September 3, 1987.

His order dismissing that case
This state court action was

filed on September 6, 1987.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

As applied to the facts of this case, Utah Code

Ann. §78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) operates so as to deny
plaintiff equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1 §24 of the Constitution of Utah.

This violation arises from

the different treatment accorded to mothers and fathers of illegitimate children under the statute, whj^ch requires the consent
of the mother before any aoption can occur but does not require
that of the father.

In this case, where the identity and location

of the father was known, the statute's

gender based distinction

between the father and mother cannot be found to be substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental objective
and, therefore, is violative of equal protection.
2.

As applied to the facts of this case, Utah Code Ann.

§78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol.9, 1987) operates so as to deny plaintiff due
process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article 1 §7 of the Utah
Constitution.

This result occurs because Mr. Swayne was irre-

buttably presumed, under the terms of the statute, to have
abandoned his daughter by virtue of his failure to file an
acknowledgement of paternity prior to the time that she was
surrendered for adoption by her mother, even though Mr. Swayne
had in fact not abandoned the child, was unaware of any obligation
on his part to file the acknowledgement to preserve his parental
rights and was not informed of any intent on the part of the
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mother to place the child for adoption.

Under the circumstances

of this case, termination of Mr. Swayne!s parental rights is
inconsistent with any notion of fundamental fairness and is,
therefore, violative of due process.
3.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) violates

the provisions of Article 1 §11 of the Utah Constitution because
it denies the plaintiff judicial recourse for vindication of his
parental rights and does so on the basis of statute of repose
which barred his claim before he was even aware that his parental
rights were under attack.

Utah's Open Court provision prohibits

the creation of statutes of repose which operate to extinguish
claims before they even arise.
ARGUMENT
POINT I -

AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-30-4
(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) IS VIOLATIVE
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution prohibit enforcement of statutes which treat individuals who are similarly situated in a different fashion.
expressed by the Utah Supreme Court,
[ajlthough their Language is dissimilar,
these provisions embody the same general
principles: persons simiarly situated
should be treated similarly, and persons
in different circumstances should not
be treated as if their circumstance were
the same.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).
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As

As applied to the facts of this case, Utah's adoption
statute violates this fundamental principle in both of the
prohibited manners.

The statute operates so as to treat two

similarly situated parents of an illegitimate child in a
different manner and also treats all fathers of such children as
though their circumstances were the same, even though they are not.
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides that
in all cases the consent of the mother is required prior to any
adoption of her child (presuming of course the mother is living
and has not had her parental rights terminated by judicial
decree).

This protection is afforded without regard to: whether

the child is legitimate; the mother's actual willingness to
fulfill her parental responsibilities; or the mother's failure to
file an acknowledgment of her willingness to support the child
with the registrar of vital statistics.
The father of an illegitimate child, however, is given
neither the right nor the opportunity to consent to an adoption
of his child unless he files an acknowledgment of paternity and
willingness and intent to support the child with the registrar
of vital statistics.in the department of health.

Under the express

terms of the statute the parents of an illegitimate child are
accorded different legal rights solely on the basis of their sex.
The question therefore arises whether this classification is a
reasonable exercise of legislative authority designed to further
a legitimate state interest.

As stated by the Court in Malan v.
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Lewis, supra,
[w]hether a statute meets equal protection
standards depends in the first instance
upon the objectives of the statute and
whether the classifications established
provide a reasonable basis for promoting
those objectives.
693 P.2d at 670.
The statutory objectives of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4 have
been previously identified by the Utah Supreme Court.

As

articulated by the Court in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of
Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), the state
has a strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume
the parental role over [illegitimate]
children, not just to assure immediate
and continued physical care but also
to facilitate early and uninterupted
bonding of the child to its parents.
The state must therefore have legal
means to ascertain within a very
short time of birth whether the
biological parents (or either or them)
are going to assert their constitutional
rights and fulfill their corresponding
responsibilities, or whether adoptive
parents must be substituted.
681 P.2d at 203.
While there can be little question that: this statement sets
forth a valid state objective, equal protection requires a
determination of whether or not the statutory classification
scheme employed provides a reasonable basis for promoting this
objective.

Although the statute provides a method of identifying

some fathers who are willing to fulfill their parental responsibilities, it in fact defeats the stated objective by not requiring
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any mother to take any action to identify herself as a willing
parent.

This case graphically illustrates how the statute can,

in certain circumstances, frustrate the state's objective.
Mr. Swayne, who has expressed his willingness to fulfill
his responsibilities, was not "identified11 as a willing parent
because the statutory method of identification, filing a notice
with the registrar of vital statistics,
method of identifying willing fathers.

is itself an "unreasonable"
Reason would suggest

that such fathers can be identified by examining their relationship
with their child.

Ms. Paxman, the child s mother, was inaccurately

"identified" as a willing parent simply because of her sex.
Therefore, while the statute automatically gave her the rights
of a responsible parent, it did so inspite of the fact that she
was not.
A statutory provision which operates to differentiate between
men and women in a manner which takes parental rights away from
responsible fathers while fully vesting such rights in irresponsible mothers cannot be found to provide a reasonable means
of speedily identifying willing parents.

Accordingly, the

classification employed violates the principles of equal protection
in the circumstances of this case.

As stated by the Court in

Malan v. Lewis, supra,
[i]f the relationship of the classification to the statutory objective
is unreasonable or fanciful, the
discrimination is unreasonably.
693 P.2d at 671.

-9-

The defendants in this action have not, and cannot, offer
any explanation of how the gender based discrimination in the
statute promotes the legitimate state insterest of speedily
identifying willing parents in the context of the facts of this
case.

There simply is none.
While it has been asserted that the state has a special

interest in speedily establishing the intentions of the father
of an illegitimate child, it canft be denied that it has an equal
interest in speedily establishing those of the mother.
the statute does nothing to facilitate this goal.

Yet,

However, because

the statute often only comes into play when the mother is
expressly abdicating her parental responsibilities, the focus
of judicial analysis is frequently upon the state's interest in
speedily determining if the child can be made available for
adoption.

This raises the question of how the state may deal with

the parental rights of a father whose identity and location may
be unknown.

While it must be acknowledged that the state can

legitimately enact measures designed to require such fathers to
come forward or suffer termination of their parental rights, the
state may not use the problems presented by absent fathers
to discriminate against identified, present and willing fathers
of illegitimate children.

To do so violates the second portion

of the equal protection guarantee, that "persons in different
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances
were the same.11

Malan v. Lewis, supra at 669.

Accordingly,

while potential problems associated with the rights of fathers
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of illegitimate children may make such fathers an appropriate
class for distinct legislative treatment, the members of that
class whose circumstances present none of the problems which the
statute was designed to meet cannot, constitutionally, be treated
as though they did.

M

[A] statute fair upon its fact may shown

to be void and unenforceable as applied."
615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980).

Ellis v. Social Services,

In short, a statute designed

to provide a means for terminating the parental rights of
unidentified or unwilling fathers should have no application to
a known and willing father.
It must be born in mind that it is only a legitimate state
objective which can justify a legislative classification.
fore, the fact that the statute in question functions

There-

in a

manner which facilitates the adoption process, by removing
potential obstacles in the adoption of illegitimate children by
strangers, is no defense to an attack on its constitutionality
because the state has no valid interest in terminating the parental
rights of a willing and responsible father whose child happens to
be illegitimate.

See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

The irrationality of the discrimination employed by our
statute is graphically demonstrated by reference to the facts of
this case.

On June 8, when the mother, father and infant child

were all together in the father's apartment, the mother's parental
rights were fully vested and the fatherfs were not.
left the child

Had the mother

with Steven and gone to California he could not have
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effected a termination of her parental rights by surrendering
the child to L.D.S. Social Services.

However, on the next day,

when they were again all together at Steven's apartment, the
mother had already extinguished Steven's rights by signing her
consent form.

Before she left for California, leaving behind

her natural daughter, Ms. Paxman had been able to terminate
Steven's rights even though he was willing to stay and care for
the child.
In Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, supra, the Court
suggested there are reasonable bases for the statute's classifications (between unwed mothers and fathers and between fathers
who file and those who do not), yet neither in that opinion nor
any other

has any Court been able to articulate any such basis.

What must ultimately be recognized is that Utah's adoption law
attempts to deal with the problems of unknown fathers with far
too broad of a brush.

It accords mothers with too much protection,

it accords fathers who file their notice with too much protection,
and it leaves the rights of some fit and willing fathers totally
at the mercy of the mother.

It is improper to vests such power

in the mother alone.
The actions of both parents after the
birth of their child determine their
ability to accept parental responsibility. An unwed mother may have no
more desire to conceive or knowledge
of the conception than the unwed Father.
Nevertheless she is given a choice to
keep or relinquish the child because she
gave birth. Her decision to release
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the child for adoption should not
deprive the father of a meaningful
opportunity to retain and develop
his relationship.
In Re Baby Girl M, 688 P.2d 918, 925 (Cal. 1984).
The simple fact is that under the Utah statutory scheme
an indifferent and unfit mother has the absolute right to prevent
the adoption of her child until her parental rights have been
terminated by judicial decree, while a caring and involved father
can see his rights totally forfeited by virtue of his failure
to comply with an unknown filing requirement.

There is no rational

justification for this disparity of treatment between men and
women and it serves no governmental interest to discriminate
against interested fathers and in favor of disinterested mothers.
Such a statutory scheme was condemned by the United
States Supreme Court in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
In that action the Court struck down a New York statute which
purported to require an unwed mother to consent to an adoption
of her child but imposed no such requirement of receiving the
consent of an unwed father.

The Court expressly noted that any

attempt to justify such a discrimination by virtue of the fact
that unwed fathers often cannot be located or identified or that
they often do not accept their parental obligations has to be
rejected in a case where the father is known and willing to act
as a father.
In those cases where the father never
has come forward to participate in
the rearing of the child, nothing in
the Equal Protection Clause precludes
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the State from withholding from him
the privilege of vetoing the adoption
of that child. Indeed, under the statute
as it now stands the surrogate may
proceed in the absence of consent
when the parent whose consent otherwise
would be required never has come forward
or has abandoned the child. But in
cases such as this, where the father
has established a substantial relationship
with the child and has admitted his
paternity, a State should have no
difficulty in identifying the father
even of children born out of wedlock.
Thus, no showing has been made that
the different treatment afforded unmarried mothers under §111 bears a substantial relationship in the proclaimed
interest of the State in promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children.
In sum, we believe that §111 is
another example of "overbroad generalizations" in gender-based classifications. The effect of New York's
classification is to discriminate against
unwed fathers even where their identity
is known and they have manifested a
significant paternal interests in the
child. The facts of this case illustrate
the harshness of classifying unwed
fathers as being invariably less
qualified and entitled than mothers to
exercise a concerned judgment as to
the fate of their children. Section 111
both excludes some loving fathers from
full participation in the decision whether
their children will be adopted and, at
the same time, enables some alienated
mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal
rights of fathers. We conclude that this
undifferentiated distinction between
unwed mothers and unwed fathers, applicable
in all circumstances where adoption of a
child of theirs is at issue, does not
bear a substantial relationship to the
State's asserted interests.
441 U.S. at 392-93.
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Every argument advanced as a justification for treating
unwed fathers differently from unwed mothers is premised upon
the potential differences between how they may deal with the
child.

However, these justifications are entirely absent when

an unwed father has publicly acknowledged his child and expressed
the desire to support the child both financially and emotionally.
When the purported rationale for the differing statutory treatment
of men and women is absent, the statutory discrimination cannot be
constitutionally applied.
463 U.S. 248 (1983),

As the Court noted in Lehr v. Robertson,

ff

these statutes may not constitutionally be

applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are
in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship
with the child."

463 U.S. at 267.

In the only challenge to the statute which was predicated
upon equal protection grounds, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
statute, but did so on the basis of an inherently contradictory
interpretation of the effect of the adoption by acknowledgment
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-30-12(Rep.Vol. 9 1987).

In

Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980), the
Court indicated that the situation presented in Caban would not
occur in Utah.
The problem present in Caban is
obviated in this jurisdiction by
the provisions of U.C.A. §1953,
78-30-12 . . . where the father
of an illegitimate child complies
with the provisions of that statute,
his rights with respect to the child
are as though the child were born
legitimate. There is therefore no
merit to plaintiff's contention that
he has been denied equal protection
-15-

of the laws.
615 P.2d at 1255.
While this assertion has the superficial ring of truth,
it ignores the Court's own holding in that same case.

Earlier

in the opinion the Court stated that
whenever the natural mother relinquishes
custody of the child either to an agency
or to an individual for purposes of
adoption, in order to protect his rights
under U.C.A. 1953, 78-30-12, the putative
father must file a notice of paternity
with the Bureau. Where he fails timely
to act, he flshall be barred from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action
to establish his paternity of the child.ff
In the instant case, the child's mother
has relinquished custody of the child
for the purposes of adoption, and for
plaintiff to avail himself of the provisions
relating to "public acknowledgement11 of
the child, he must show that he has acted
timely.
615 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added).
The effect of this holding is to render the supposed
protection offered unwed fathers by §78-30-12 illusory, because
if the father who has publicly acknowledged the child doesn't
file the statutory notice timely (before his child is released
for adoption by the mother) then his parental rights are extinguished.
Ellis, therefore, presents an example of the form of
insoluble dilemma known in the vernacular as a Catch 22.

A

man who claims §78-30-4(3) discriminates against willing fathers
is told that a separate statute, §78-30-12, protects such fathers.
However, if he attempts to make recourse to that statutory
protection he is told he must first have complied with the
-16-

provisions of the statute of which he originally complained.
These propositions are mutually inconsistent and, as an explanation of why the statute doesnft unfairly discriminate, nonsensical .
For example, in this case Mr. Swayne has publicly acknowledged paternity of the child, received it into his home
for visits, was present when the child was born, has filed an
acknowledgement of paternity, has jointly petitioned with the
mother to have his name added to the birth certificate and to give
the child his family name, and has paid doctor's expenses
associated with his daughter!s birth.

Under these circumstances

there is no question but that he has done that which was necessary
to have legitimated the child by acknowledgment.

Slade v. Dennis,

594 P.2d 898 (Utah 1979). In Slade, the Supreme Court recognized
that adoption by acknowledgement statutes have traditionally been
interpreted to require only that the father of an illegitimate
child publicly acknowledge his paternity, receive the child into
his home (even if for brief visits) and treat the child as one
would were she his legitimate offspring.

In this case there is,

therefore, no dispute that Steven satisfied these tests.
Accordingly, under the terms of the language used in Ellis,
M

his rights with respect to the child are as though the child

were born legitimate11.

615 P. 2d at 1255.

If this is true, then

Mr. Swayne is not the father of an "illegitimate child" within
the meaning of §78-30-4(3)(a), and he need not file in the manner
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required and within the time set forth in that statute and,
therefore, as the father of a legitimate child his consent is
mandatory before an adoption can be had.
The other holding of Ellis, however, mandates a filing
before the child of any unwed father is placed or his parental
rights under §78-30-12 are forfeited.

Plaintiff submits that

on re-examination of this question there can be no doubt that
the Court would reach a contrary result.
While the plaintiff believes that Utah's adoption
statute is facially unconstitutional, it is respectfully submitted
that as specifically applied to Mr. Swaynefs circumstance, there
can be no doubt that the statute's gender discrimination did not
provide a reasonable method to identify his child1s responsible
parent, and in fact served to prohibit such identification.
POINT

II -

AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE,
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-30-4(3) (Rep.
Vol. 9 1987) VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS
GUARANTEES OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH.

Although the Utah Supreme Court has found the provisions of
this statute to be facially valid under the Due Process clauses
of both the Utah and United States Constitutions, it has recognized
that application of the statute can violate those provisions under
particular circumstances.

See, e.g., Wells v. Children's Aid Soc.

of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); In Re Adoption of Baby Doe,
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717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986).

Indeed, a recent decision of this Court

demonstrates that application of the statute to a father who has
promptly asserted his parental rights when given a reasonable
opportunity to do so would never be consistent with the principles
of due process.
In In the Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987),
this Court held that considerations of due process prohibited
application of the parental rights "forefeiture" provisions of
§78-30-4(3)(c)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) to a father who filed his acknowledgement of paternity the very day that he learned the mother
of his child had petitioned the Court to permit the child to be
adopted by another man.

In affirming the District Court's order

dismissing the adoption petition, this Court noted that the father
had failed to file his acknowledgement of paternity within the
time prescribed by the statute but held that this failure did not
preclude further analysis of the facts to determine if due process
required that he be treated as though he had complied.
[A]lthough we have found that respondent
failed to timely file, we must also examine
whether the statute was constitutionally
applied to respondent. The state's interest,
as represented in the statute, is to allow
for early adoption of illegitimate children
and commencement of the bonding process
between the child and its new adoptive
parents. Such interest must be balanced
against the constitutionally protected right
of an unwed father to maintain and develop
a parental relationship. In Utah, the Supreme
Court has declared that under the Utah Constitution the parental interest is a "fundamentalM right to be invaded only to the11
extent necessary to promote a "compelling
state interest.
740 P.2d at 296.
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After noting the short delay involved in the father's
filing, the Court concluded that
[amplication of the statute to invalidate
respondent's acknowledgement of paternity
would impermissible violate respondentsfs
constitutional rights under both the
Utah and United States Constitutions.
740 P.2d at 297.
This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's
position as expressed in In Re Adoption of Baby Doe, 717 P.2d
686 (Utah 1986), wherein the Court stated that
where a father does not know of
the need to protect his rights,
there is no "reasonable opportunity"
to assert or protect paternal rights.
In such a case, the operation of the
statute fails to achieve the desired
balance and raises serious due process
concerns.
717 P.2d at 691.
In that case the father filed his acknowledgement of
paternity two days after the mother surrendered the child for
adoption, but one day after he learned of the proposed adoption.
The Court concluded that his filing must be given effect because
he had shown
that the termination of the parental
rights was contrary to basic notions
of due process, and that he came forward
within a reasonable time after the
baby's birth, [such that] he should be
deemed to have complied with the statute.
717 P.2d at 691.
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In this action, Mr. Swayne filed his acknowledgement
on the first day it was possible to do so after learning that
his child had been surrendered for adoption by her mother.

He

had received no prior notice of the mother's intent to take
this action, despite having been with the mother and child each
day but one of the child's life prior to her release by the
mother.

Under the facts of this case it cannot be said that Mr.

Swayne was provided a "reasonable opportunity" to assert his
rights in a manner consistent with the demands of due process.
Accordingly, the purported waiver of his rights set forth in
Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3)(c) cannot be constitutionally applied
to this case and he should be found by this Court to have all the
rights and duties of a natural father who has acknowledged paternity,
including the right to custody of his infant daughter.
The reason that the statute cannot be applied constitutionally in this case is very simple, as the statute does not
provide an unwed father with adequate protection to insure that
he has a reasonable opportunity to develop his constitutionally
protected relationship with his child.

This so-called "oppor-

tunity interest" of an unwed father is one expressly recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983), and one which was recently defined by the
Georgia Supreme Court in In Re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E. 2d
459 (Ga.1987). The Georgia Court noted that
it is an interest which an unwed
father has a right to pursue through
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his commitment to becoming a father
in a true relational sense as well
as in a biological sense. Absent
abandonment of his interest, a
state may not deny a biological
father a reasonable opportunity to
establish a relationship with his
child.
358 S.E. 2d at 462.
The Georgia Court also noted that absent a demonstration
of unfitness, a
biological father who pursues his
interest in order to obtain full
custody of his child must be
allowed to prevail over strangers
to the child who seek to adopt.
358 S.E. 2d at 463.
The defendants cannot seriously contend that Mr. Swayne
in fact abandoned his opportunity interest in his baby daughter
in the four days following
not.
home.

her birth because he manifestly did

He visited her daily, both in the hospital and his own
He invited his family to meet and visit with his daughter

and he openly and publicly acknowledged his paternity.
There is no question that the natural father of a child has
a constitutionally protected interest in his parental rights
relative to his child.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in

Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984),
The relationship between parent and
child is protected by the federal
and state constitutions. These protections include the father of an
illegitimate child.
681 P.2d at 202 (citations omitted).

-22-

The Court has held that parental rights are fundamental,
and as such, can only be terminated to the extent necessary
to further a compelling state interest.

In In Re J.P., 648

P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), the Court concluded that
the right of a parent not to be
deprived of parental rights without
a showing of unfitness, abandonment
or substantial neglect is so
fundamental to our society and so
basic to our constitutional order
that it ranks among those rights
referred to in Article I §25 of the
Utah Constitution and the Ninth
Amendment of the United States
Constitution as being retained by
the people.
648 P.2d at 1375.
While the Court has noted that parental rights
cannot be constitutionally terminated except upon a judicial
finding of parental unfitness or abandonment, Utah Code Ann.
§78-30-4(3)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) purports to mandate such a finding
in all cases where the father of an illegitimate child hasn't
filed an acknowledgement of paternity before his child is placed
for adoption.

The statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that

a father who files Muntimelyf? has abandoned his child.

This is

the exact form of constitutional infirmity in a statute which was
condemned by the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), where it was held that an Illinois statute which conclusively presumed fathers of illegitimate children to be unfit
parents violated due process.

In that case, the Court noted that

Illinois
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insists on presuming rather than
proving Stanley's unfitness solel}^
because it is more convenient to
presume than prove. Under the Due
Process Clause that advantage is
insufficient to justify refusing
a father a hearing when the issue
at stake is the dismemberment of
his family.
405 U.S. at 658.
The Utah statute purports to presume abandonment,
rather than prove it, by virtue of an ommission in filing a
document.

It does not provide for

any examination of the actual

relationship of the father with the child.

This fact is dramati-

cally demonstrated in this action because it is undisputed that
the plaintiff had no intent to and did not abandon his child.
His failure to file a document of which he was unaware prior to
the happening of an event he had no reason to anticipate simply
cannot be viewed as conclusive evidence of his intent to abandon
the child.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that parental rights
may be terminated for abandonment only flwhen the evidence
is clear and convincing.11
1286 (Utah 1981).

McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P. 2d

Abandonment occurs where

the parent has either expressed
an intention, or so conducted himself
as to clearly indicate an intention,
to relinquish parental rights and
reject his parental responsibilities
to his child.
628 P.2d at 1288.
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In In Re J. Children, 664 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1983), the Court
defined abandonment as consisting of
conduct on the part of the parent
which implies a conscious disregard
of the obligations owed by a parent
to the child, leading to the destruction
of the parent-child relationship.
664 P.2d at 1159.

The Court noted that the proof required to

demonstrate abandonment was the same in an adoption case as in
a termination proceeding.

In light of these holdings, it

is

remarkable that §78-30-4(3) purports not only to remove any
burden of proving abandonment but to affirmatively preclude all
evidence demonstrating a lack of abandonment.
The effect of the statute is to deny an unwed father
substantive due process by denying him any opportunity to contest
the presumption of abandonment.

"Substantive due process concerns

the content of the rules specifying when a right can be lost or
impaired."

Wells, supra, at 204.

While much of the litigation surrounding §78-30-4(3)
has focused on the lack of notice accorded unwed fathers, that
deficiency is of no constitutional significance under Utah's
statutory scheme for two reasons.

First, even if the statute

provided for notice of the adoption to be given to all fathers
and allowed them a hearing, the scope of such hearing would be
limited to determining whether or not he filed a timely acknowledgement.

This is a finding that already occurs even in his
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absence and his presence would not materially assist in making
that determination.
Second, there is no question that an absolute right
to notice of a proceeding wherein parental rights may be terminated is not constitutional^ required.

If it were, the most

unfit parents could frustrate all efforts to terminate their
rights by abandoning their children and keeping their whereabouts
a secret.

Accordingly, §78-30-4 is not facially invalid merely

because it doesn't require notice to a putative father as a
condition of adoption.
The due process deficiency with the statute is that it
operates to terminate a father's rights as a parent before any
adjudication of his abandonment occurs and precludes him from
ever contesting the "finding" of abandonment.
As the Supreme Court noted in Stanley, a irrebuttable
presumption of this nature violates due process if the fact
presumed is not the necessary result of the fact determined.
In Stanley, the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois statute
which purported to equate a father's status as unmarried with
the fact of unfitness.
It may be, as the State insists, that
most unmarried fathers are unsuitable
and neglectful parents. It may also be
that Stanley is such a parent and that his
children should be placed in other hands.
But all unmarried fathers are not in this
category; some are wholly suited to have
custody of their children. This much the
State readily concedes, and nothing in
this record indicates that Stanley is
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or has been a neglectful father who has not
cared for his children. Given the opportunity to make his case, Stanley may have
been seen to be deserving of custody of
his offspring. Had this been so, the
State's statutory policy would have been
furthered by leaving custody to him.
405 U.S. at 654-55.
The Court expressly rejected the notion that the State's
asserted need for expeditous determinations regarding the child
custody could override a parent's constitutionally protected
interest in relation to his children.
The establishment of prompt efficacious
procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends is a proper state interest worthy
of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency . . .
Procedure by presumption is always
cheaper and easier than individualized
determination. But when, as here, the
procedure forecloses the determinative
issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities
in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over
the important interests of both parent
and child. It therefore cannot stand.
405 U.S. at 656-57.
This holding is equally applicable to the present action
where the statute irrebuttably presumes abandonment when that
finding would be impossible to make on the real evidence.
While it has been repeatedly noted that the State of
Utah has a strong and legitimate interest in identifying and
placing for adoption those children who are without parents
wiling to provide for them, the State has no interest in depriving
children of their natural father who is willing to fulfill his
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paternal duties.

As expressed by the Court in Stanley, the

state's legitimate interest can be disserved if a statute
operates in such a manner as to define certain children as
needing adoption when they do not.
[W]e are here not to evaluate the
legitimacy of state ends, rather,
to determine whether the means used
to achieve those ends are constitutionally
defensible. What is the state interest
in separating children from fathers
without a hearing designed to determine
whether the father is unfit in a
particular case? We observe that
the State registers no gain when it
separates children from the custody
of fit parents. Indeed, if [the
unwed father] is a fit father, the
State spites its own articulated goals
when it needlessly separates him from
his family.
405 U.S. at 652-53.
The due process violation contained in §78-30-4(3) is
not its lack of required notice but rather the refusal to allow
a meaningful hearing to a father who i_s^ aware of the adoption
proceeding.

Utah law recognizes that the right to notice and

the right to be heard are not co-extensive.

For example, in

adoptive proceedings a natural grandparent has a right to be
heard even though he has no right to notice of the proceeding.
See Wilson v. Family Services Div., 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976).
It is the statute's attempt to preclude a father from
establishing his willingness to fulfill his parental duties, not
its failure to inform him that his rights are under attack, which
violates due process.

This is true because a father who has,

or is attempting to establish, a true parental relationship with
his child is bound to discover that his parental rights are being
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questioned or that another man is asserting an entitlement to
those rights.

The issue in this case is, when such a discovery

is made and the father seeks judicial relief, is it constitutional
to preclude him from offering evidence that his child is not in
need of adoption?
The inherent constitutional defect in Utah's statute
is that it does not provide adequate protection for this "opportunityff of a biological father, which can be lost immediately
upon the birth of the child, not only without notice but without
any judicial recourse to assert his entitlement and to petition
for time to take advantage of this valuable opportunity.
While Lehr v. Robertson, supra, holds that an unwed
father can lose this opportunity by the passage of a significant
period of time wherein he doesn't take advantage of his protected
status, the Court did not hold or suggest that this opportunity
could be lost in a matter of days, and lost months prior to the time
when a petition to adopt the child can even be granted.
It should also be noted that Lehr was a step-parent
adoption case where the father's rights were terminated only
because of a finding that the child's best interest would be
served by allowing her step-father to acquire parental rights.
It has been suggested that the holding in Lehr in no way
applies to cases involving adoptions by strangers.
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The time limitation [in which an
unmarried father must assert his
rights] per se applies only when
another man has independently taken
on the responsibilities of fatherhood
for the child and asks the state to
validate an already existing relationship.
If the mother of the child consents
to the child's adoption by strangers,
the state still is required under
the principles of Stanley, unaltered
by the Lehr opinion, to notify and
allow participation by a natural
father who, like Lehr, has done
nothing to evidence officially a
waiver or loss of his interest in
the child. Failure to attempt to
notify a father in this circumstance
under a scheme like New York's should
be unconstitutional even after Lehr.
E. Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before
and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State L.Rev. 313, 367
(1984).
In short, Lehr is not persuasive authority for upholding
Utah's unique statutory scheme because it deaLs with a wholly
different statute which allows adequate protection of an unwed
father's "opportunity" interest in establishing a parental relationship with his child.

Utah's scheme fails to reasonably protect

this interest and, as such, is violative of the most basic
notion of fundamental fairness.
It must be emphasized that the issue in this case is
whether or not Utah's statute provided Mr. Swayne with adequate
safeguards for his constitutionally protected "opportunity interest"
in establishing a true parental relationship with his baby girl.
This analysis must be made without consideration being given
to the perceived interests of the proposed adoptive parents, of
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L.D.S. Social Services, or even of the child herself.

As noted

in Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before
and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio State Law Journal 313, 373
(1984), where a biological father who asserts his rights promptly
is seeking to block a proposed adoption by "strangers, the fatherfs
opportunity to establish a protected relationship must prevail
in the absence of his unfitness".
The Utah Supreme Court has held that consideration of a
child's best interests cannot provide the basis for termination
of parental rights.

In Re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).

The

question presented in this case, as in all cases of termination
of a parent's rights, should be whether or not Mr. Swaynefs
actions warrant a finding of unfitness, substantial neglect or
abandonment.

However, because the provisions of §78-30-4(3)

foreclose actual consideration of this question, the statute burdens
fundamental constitutional rights without providing any opportunity
for an unwed father to establish his fitness or rebut the presumption of abandonment.
The absurdity of the statute's conclusive presumption of
abandonment is highlighted by the facts of this case.

On June 9,

1987, when Mr. Swayne was visiting with his daughter in his own
home he had already been "deemed" to have abandonmed his baby, an
infant less than a week old with whom he had spent a part of
every day of her life save one.

A statute which can operate

to create an abandonment where none exists is not consistant with
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the notions of basic fairness which lie at the heart of the
concept of due process, and cannot be given effect in the circumstances present in this action.
POINT III -

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3)(c)(Rep.
Vol. 9 1987) VIOLATES Art. 1 § 11
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3)(c)(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) provides
that
[a]ny father of [an illegitimate] child
who fails to file and register his notice
of claim to paternity and his agreement
to support the child shall be barred from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any
action to establish his paternity of the
child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of any right to
notice of or to a hearing in any judicial
proceeding for the adoption of said child,
and the consent of such father to the
adoption of such child shall not be
required.
This provision purports to divest a natural father
from making recourse to the courts for vindication of the injury
done to him arising from the deprivation of his rights as a parent,
Art. 1 §11 of the Constitution of Utah specifies that
[a]11 courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in
his person, property or reputation shall
have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.
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That the termination of parental rights carries a stigma
of unfitness to be a parent, and is therefore an injury to
reputation protected by this constitutional proscription, is
manifest.

Therefore, Utah's MOpen Courts" provision requires

that plaintiff be given recourse to the Courts to vindicate this
injury.

The fact that plaintiff's parental rights could have been

protected by filing an acknowledgement of paternity before any
dispute arose cannot save the statute from constitutional infirmity.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently noted that a statute cannot
abrogate a cause of action before it even arises.

In Berry v.

Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Court struck down
a statute of repose in products liability cases as violative of
the Open Courts provision of our Constitution.

It rejected the

argument that a remedy was available Mby due course of lawM where
such a purported remedy was so limited as to expire before an
injury occurred.

The Court reasoned that it was sophistry to

suggest that such a provision was the equivalent to a limitation
statute.
In short, the constitutional protection
cannot be evaded by the semantic argument
that a cause of action is not cut off
but only defined to exist for a specified
period of time.
717 P.2d at 679.
Plaintiff submits that any statute which purports
to limit a citizen seeking judicial relief for his injury to
a period which can expire prior to the date of his injury is
violative of Art. 1 §11.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(3) is
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such a statute because it bars judicial relief as of the
very moment a controversy first arises.
CONCLUSION
Legislation designed to address the problems associated
with unidentified or absent fathers of illegitimate children is
both rational and necessary to an effective adoption scheme.
However, such legislation cannot treat these problems in a manner
which permits the fundamental, constitutionally protected interests
of a known, present and willing father to be lost without any
opportunity to demonstrate that he is not in the class of fathers
giving rise to the need for such legislation.

Furthermore,

the legislation may not make unreasonable classifications vesting
all mothers with full parental rights while conditioning a father's
rights upon the completion of an act which bears no logical
relationship to his actual willingness to assume his responsibilities
as a parent.
In Mr. Swaynefs case, application of the statute would
result in the absurd finding that he abandoned his daughter when
there is no question that he did not, and would allow this result
to be achieved by virtue of the actions taken by the mother
of the child, who definitively did abandon all her interest in
making any other decisions about the child's future.

Accordingly,

this Court should hold that the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987) are unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of this case, should order custody of the child to be placed
with Mr. Swayne and should remand the case for consideration of
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the appropriate award of attorney's fees pursuant to the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. §1988.
DATED this

day of May, 1988.

M. David Eckersley

Billy L. Walker, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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APPENDIX
1.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4(Rep.Vol. 9 1987)

2.

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-12(Rep.Vol. 9 1987)

3.

United States Const., Amend. V

4.

United States Const., Amend. XIV, §1

5.

Constitution of Utah, Art. 1 §7

6.

Constitution of Utah, Art. 1 §11

7.

Constitution of Utah, Art. 1 §24

78-30-4. Consent to adoption — Paternity claims.
(1) A child cannot be adopted without the consent of each living parent
having rights in relation to 6aid child, except that consent is not necessary
from a father or mother who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the
child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, that the district
court may order the adoption of any child, without notice to or consent in court
of the parent or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the parent or
parents whose consent would otherwise be required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgments,
released his or her or their control or custody of such child to any agency
licensed to receive children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8a, Title
55, and such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption or whenever it
shall appear that the parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be
required have theretofore, in writing, released his or her or their control,
custody, and all parental rights and interests in such child to any agency
licensed or authorized by statute to receive children for placement or adoption
in any state pursuant to that state's laws and said agency has in turn, in
writing, released its control and custody of such child to any agency licensed
under Chapter 8a, Title 55, or to any person, or persons, selected by that
agency licensed under Utah law, as adoptive parents for said child, and such
Utah agency consents, in writing, to such adoption.
(2) A minor parent shall have the power to consent to the adoption of such
parent's child, and a minor parent shall have the power to release such parent's control or custody of such parent's child to any agency licensed to receive
children for placement or adoption under Chapter 8 [Chapter 8a], Title 55,
and, such a consent or release so executed shall be valid and have the same
force and effect as a consent or release executed by an adult parent. A minor
parent, having so executed a release or consent, cannot revoke the same upon
such parent's attaining the age of majority.
[3) (a) A person who is the father or claims to be the father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by
registering with the registrar of vital statistics in the department of
health, a notice of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and of his
willingness and intent to support the child to the best of his ability. The
department of health shall provide forms for the purpose of registering
the notices, and the forms shall be made available through the department and in the office of the county clerk in every county in this state.
(b) The notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must
be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or
placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services or prior to the
filing of a petition by a person with whom the mother has placed the child
for adoption. The notice shall be signed by the registrant and shall include his name and address, the name and last known address of the
mother, and either the birthdate of the child or the probable month and
year of the expected birth of the child. The department of health shall
maintain a confidential registry for this purpose.
(c) Any father of such child who fails to file and register his notice of
claim to paternity and his agreement to support the child shall be barred
from thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to establish his paternity of the child. Such failure shall further constitute an abandonment of
said child and a waiver and surrender of any right to notice of or to a
hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child, and the
consent of such father to the adoption of such child shall not be required.
(d) In any adoption proceeding pertaining to an illegitimate child, if
there is no showing that the father has consented to the proposed adoption, it shall be necessary to file with the court prior to the granting of a
decree allowing the adoption a certificate from the department of health,
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics which certificate shall state
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from fathers of illegitimate children and that no registration has been found
pertaining to the father of the illegitimate child in question.

The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his
family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby
adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not
apply to such an adoption.

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1*
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

ART. I, § 7

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
*
ART. 1, §11

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

^ All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counse? any civil cause to which
he is a party.
ART. I, § 24

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

